Insolvency timing and managerial decision-making
Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards de...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Link to e-book |
| Summary: | Frederik Drescher addresses the timing of non-mandatory insolvency filings based on threatening illiquidity (18 InsO) with the aim of a company's restructuring as an agency problem between owners and management. Using a decision model, the author develops the hypothesis of a tendency towards delayed insolvency filings and confirms it experimentally. Moreover, he analyzes different incentive instruments potentially leading to earlier insolvency filings. Contents Insolvency Timing as an Agency Problem Financial Distress and Insolvency Timing Managerial Insolvency Timing Decision Experimental Testing of Interest Alignment Instruments Target Groups Researchers and students in the field of business economics with a focus on corporate restructuring and decision theory Practitioners in corporate restructuring and insolvency professionals, managers and company owners. |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource. |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references. |
| Published: |
Wiesbaden :
SpringerGabler,
[2013?]
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| ISBN: | 9783658028190 (electronic bk.) 365802819X (electronic bk.) |